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Abstract
This paper investigates arbitrage chains involving four currencies and four foreign ex-
change trader-arbitrageurs. In contrast with the three-currency case, we find that arbi-
trage operations when four currencies are present may appear periodic in nature, and not
involve smooth convergence to a “balanced” ensemble of exchange rates in which the law
of one price holds. The goal of this article is to understand some interesting features of
sequences of arbitrage operations, features which might well be relevant in other contexts
in finance and economics.
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systems
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1. Introduction
An arbitrage operation involves buying some good or asset for a lower price than
that for which it can be sold, taking advantage of any imbalance in the quoted prices.
The “law of one price” is a statement of a key implication of the absence of arbitrage
opportunities. In turn arbitrage is often the process invoked to explain why goods or
assets that are in some sense “identical” should have a common price.
A study of commodity prices since 1273 concluded that “. . . despite the steady decline
in transportation costs over the past 700 years, the repeated intrusion of wars and disease,
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and the changing fashions of commercial policy, the volatility and persistence of devia-
tions in the law of one price have remained quite stable” [1, p. 18]. The present paper
investigates a relatively neglected complication regarding arbitrage operations, namely
the order in which information about arbitrage opportunities is presented, illustrating
this in relation to arbitrage chains involving four currencies. The key finding is that ar-
bitrage operations can be periodic in nature, rather than involving a smooth convergence
to a law of one price.
The early literature on the law of one price is coeval with the purchasing power par-
ity explanation of foreign exchange rates. The terminology was coined in [2], involving
arbitrage between relatively homogeneous goods priced in different currencies [1, 3]. Em-
pirical tests suggest that arbitrage operations in goods do not exert a strong influence
on exchange rates until the price index deviations involved exceed about 25% [4, 5]. In-
novations that were expected to reduce price dispersion, such as the European Single
Market legislation coming into effect in 1992, and the Economic and Monetary Union
project beginning in 1999, have had little effect on price level disparities [6]. The degree
of price level dispersion between US cities has displayed no marked trend over time [7]. A
study of the prices charged for identical products in IKEA stores in twenty-five countries
revealed typical price divergences of 20–50%, differences that could not be attributed to
just country or location-specific factors [8]. Among the most cited reasons for deviations
from the law of one price are transaction costs, taxes, transport costs, trade barriers, the
costs of searching for price differences, nominal price rigidities, customer market pricing,
nominal exchange rate rigidities and differences in market power [9].
In relation to assets, an early application of the law of one price was to the interest
rate parity theory of the forward exchange rate, whereby the ratio of the forward to spot
exchange rate between two currencies is equal to the ratio of the interest rates in the
two currencies over the forward period in question [10, p. 130]. An arbitrage opportu-
nity in relation to assets can be defined as “an investment strategy that guarantees a
positive payoff in some contingency with no possibility of a negative payoff and with no
net investment” [11, online]. The absence of such arbitrage opportunities has been seen
as the unifying concept underlying mainstream theories in finance, no-arbitrage princi-
ples being applied in the Modigliani–Miller theorem of corporate capital structure, in
the Black–Scholes model of option pricing and in the arbitrage pricing model of asset
prices [12]. Actual arbitrage operations in relation to assets often involve net invest-
ment and risk and/or uncertainty, in addition to the complications arising in relation to
arbitrage in goods. Notable deviations from the law of one price in financial markets
have been documented in relation to comparable circumstances applying to closed-end
country funds, American Depository Receipts, twin shares, dual share classes and corpo-
rate spin-offs [13]. Among the limits to arbitrage in financial markets are those arising
from transactions costs [14], and those involving the capital requirements of conducting
arbitrage operations [15]. A spectacular illustration of the capital limits to arbitrage was
provided by the demise of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge funds.
The arbitrage discrepancies being exploited in LTCM’s “convergence trades” widened in
1998. LTCM attempted unsuccessfully to raise new capital to finance its arbitrage posi-
tions. To avoid a major financial collapse the New York Federal Reserve Board organised
a bail-out by creditors [16].
In what follows we focus on the limits to arbitrage arising from the order in which
information is disseminated to arbitrage traders. The illustration used is for a foreign
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exchange (FX) market with four FX traders and four currencies, see Sections 2 and 3.
An Arbiter, the metaphorical equivalent of an unpaid auctioneer in a Walrasian system,
knows all the actual exchange rates. The individual FX traders, however, initially know
only the exchange rates involving their own, domestic currencies. So the US FX trader
knows the exchange rates for the dollar against the euro, sterling and yen, but not the
cross exchange rates for the non-dollar currencies. There are no transactions costs, no net
capital requirements and no risks involved in the arbitrage operations. Instead we focus
on the information dissemination problem, and show that the order in which information
about cross exchange rate discrepancies, and hence arbitrage opportunities, is presented
makes an important difference to the sequences of arbitrage operations conducted.
A general discussion of arbitrage dynamics is given in Section 4. An unexpected fea-
ture of the processes considered in this paper is that, rather than there being a smooth
convergence to an ensemble of exchange rates with no arbitrage opportunities, the ar-
bitrage operations may display periodicity and no necessary convergence on a cross ex-
change rate law of one price. See Proposition 6 in Section 5 for a rigorous explanation.
A further unexpected feature is that, starting at an ensemble of exchange rates which is
not balanced, and using special periodic sequences of arbitrages, the Arbiter can achieve
any balanced (satisfying the law of one price) exchange rate ensemble. See, in particular,
Theorem 1 in Section 5 and Theorem 2 in Section 7. These counter-intuitive results
are new, as far as we are aware. In line with the renowned “impossibility theorem” of
[17] these results suggest an “arbitrage impossibility theorem”. Proofs are relegated to
Section 8.
The mathematical approach taken in this paper to the analysis of arbitrage operation
chains may be understood as a typical example of the asynchronous interactions that are
important in systems theory and in control theory, see the monographs [18–20] and the
surveys [21, 22]. The arbitrage chains are particularly relevant to desynchronised systems
theory, see [19]. Presence of an asynchronous interaction often leads to a dramatic com-
plication of the related mathematical problems. [23, 24] proved that many asynchronous
problems cannot be solved algorithmically, and also [25–27] and [28] demonstrated that,
even in the cases when the problem is algorithmically solvable, it is typically as hard to
solve numerically as the famous “Travelling salesman problem,” see [29] (that is, in the
mathematical language, the problem is NP-complete, see [30]). In this context the fact
that the principal questions that arise in analysis of arbitrage operation chains admit
straightforward combinatorial analysis came to the authors as a pleasant surprise. Our
construction uses a geometrical approach to visualisation of arbitrage chains presented
in Sections 6–8, which may be useful in relation to other problems in mathematical
economics.
2. The Three Currency Case
Consider a foreign exchange (FX) market that involves only three currencies: Dollars
($), Euros (e) and Sterling (£). This FX market involves three pair-wise exchange
operations:
Dollar  Euro, Dollar  Sterling, Euro Sterling.
The currencies are measured in natural currency units, and the corresponding (strictly
positive) exchange rates, r$e, r$£, re£, are well defined. For instance, one dollar can be
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exchanged for r$e euros. The rates related to the inverted arrows are reciprocal:
re$ =
1
r$e
, r£$ =
1
r$£
, r£e =
1
re£
. (1)
We treat the triplet
(r$e, r$£, re£) (2)
as the ensemble of principal exchange rates.
We suppose that, prior to a reference time moment 0, each FX trader knows only
the exchange rates involving his domestic currency. So the dollar trader does not know
the value of re£, the euro trader is unaware of r$£, and the sterling trader is unaware of
r$e. We are interested in the case where the initial rates are unbalanced in the following
sense. By assumption, the dollar trader can exchange one dollar for r$e euros. Let us
suppose that unbeknownst to him the exchange rate between sterling and euro is such
that the the dollar trader could make a profit by first exchanging a dollar for r$£ units
of sterling and then exchanging these for euros. The inequality which guarantees that
dollar trader can take advantage of this arbitrage opportunity is that the product r$£r£e
is greater than r$e:
r$£ · r£e > r$e. (3)
Let us consider the situation where the inequality (3) holds, and, after the reference
time moment 0, one of the three traders becomes aware of the third exchange rate.
The evolution of this FX market depends on which trader is the first to discover the
information concerning the third exchange rate. The following three cases are relevant.
2.1. Case 1.
The dollar trader becomes aware of the value of the rate re£. Therefore, the dollar
trader contacts the euro trader and makes a request to increase the rate r$e to the new
fairer value
rnew$e = r$£ · r£e =
r$£
re£
.
The reciprocal exchange rate re$ is also to be adjusted to the new level:
rnewe$ =
1
rnew$e
.
The result is that the principal exchange rates become balanced at the levels:
rnew$e =
r$£
re£
, r$£, re£.
2.2. Case 2.
The euro trader is the first to discover the third exchange rate r$£. By (1), inequality
(3) may be rewritten as
r$£
re£
<
1
re$
,
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which is, in turn, equivalent to re$ · r$£ > re£. In this case the euro trader could
do better by first exchanging euros for dollars, and then by exchanging the dollars for
sterling. Therefore, the euro trader requests adjustment of the rate re£ to the value
rnewe£ = re$ · r$£ =
r$£
r$e
.
In terms of the principal exchange rates the outcome is that the FX market adjusts to
the following balanced rates:
r$e, r$£, r
new
e£ =
r$£
r$e
.
2.3. Case 3.
The sterling trader is the first to discover the third exchange rate r$e. The inequality
(3) may be rewritten as r£e · re$ > r£$. Thus, the sterling trader requests adjustment
of the rate r£$ to r
new
£$ = r£e · re$. In this case the principal exchange rates become
balanced at the levels:
r$e, r
new
$£ = r$e · re£, re£.
After the adjustment of the principal exchange rates (2), following the new informa-
tion being revealed, the exchange rates become balanced, and this is the end of the arbi-
trage evolution of an FX market with three currencies. Having established the reasonably
straightforward application of arbitrage to three currencies, we now turn to investigation
what happens when the FX market contains four currencies and four currency traders.
3. Four Currencies
Consider an FX market $e£U that involves four currencies: Dollars ($), Euros (e),
Sterling (£) and Yen (U). This FX market involves six exchange relationships:
Dollar  Euro, Dollar  Sterling, Dollar  Y en,
Euro Sterling, Euro Y en, Sterling  Y en.
The exchange rates are:
r$e, r$£, r$U, re$, reU, r£U,
r£$, r£e, r£U, rU$, rUe, rU£.
The rates relating to the inverted arrows are reciprocal:
re$ =
1
r$e
, r£$ =
1
r$£
, rU$ =
1
r$U
,
r£e =
1
re£
, rUe =
1
reU
, rU£ =
1
r£U
.
(4)
Our market may be described by the ensemble of six principal exchange rates
R = (r$e, r$£, r$U, re£, reU, r£U) (5)
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together with the reciprocal exchange rates (4).
The following characterisation of balanced, no-arbitrage, exchange rates (5), that is
the ensembles of exchange rates such that no trader could do better by trading indirectly,
is convenient.
Proposition 1. Ensemble (5) of the principal exchange rates is balanced if and only if
the following relationships hold:
re£ =
r$£
r$e
, reU =
r$U
r$e
, r£U =
r$U
r$£
. (6)
Proof. This assertion can be proved by inspection.
4. Arbitrages
Let us suppose that initially each trader is aware only of the three exchange rates
involving his domestic currency. For instance, the dollar trader knows only the rates r$e,
r$£, r$U.
We are interested in the case where the rates r$e, r$£, r$U, re£, reU, r£U are un-
balanced.
For instance, let us suppose that the dollar trader can make a profit by first exchanging
one dollar for r$£ units of sterling, and then by exchanging this sterling for euros. This
means that the product r$£ · r£e is greater than r$e:
r$£ · r£e > r$e. (7)
Suppose that the dollar trader becomes aware of the rate re£, and, therefore, about the
inequality (7). The dollar trader then asks the euro trader to increase the exchange rate
r$e to the new fairer value
rnew$e = r$£ · r£e =
r$£
re£
.
Along with the adjustment of the exchange rate r$e the reciprocal rate re$ would be
adjusted to
rnewe$ =
1
rnew$e
.
We call this procedure $e£-arbitrage, and we use the notation A$e£ to represent it. We
denote by RA$e£ the ensemble of the new principal exchange rates:
Rnew = RA$e£ =
(
rnew$e , r$£, r$U, re£, reU, r£U
)
.
We also use the notation RA$e£ in the case where the inequality (7) does not hold. In
this case, of course, RA$e£ = R, and we say that arbitrage A$e£ is not active in this case.
This particular arbitrage is an example of the 24 possible arbitrages listed in Table 1.
We will also use, where convenient, the notation A(n) for the arbitrage number n from
this table: for instance, A(1) = A$e£.
The principal distinction of the FX market with four currencies from that with only
three currencies is that applying a single arbitrage operation does not bring the FX market
to a balance in which no arbitrage opportunities exist, and in which the law of one price
holds.
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Table 1: List of arbitrages
Number Arbitrage Activation condition Actions
1 A$e£ re£ > r$e · r$£ rnew$e = r$£ · r−1e£
2 A$eU r$U > r$e · reU rnew$e = r$U · r−1eU
3 A$£e r$e · re£ > r$£ rnew$£ = r$e · re£
4 A$£U r$U > r$£ · r£U rnew$£ = r$U · r−1£U
5 A$Ue r$e · reU > r$U rnew$U = r$e · reU
6 A$U£ r$£ · r£U > r$U rnew$U = r$£ · r£U
7 Ae$£ r$£ < r$e · re£ rnew$e = r$£ · r−1e£
8 Ae$U r$U < r$e · reU rnew$e = r$U · r−1eU
9 Ae£$ r$£ > re£ · r$e rnewe£ = r$£ · r−1$e
10 Ae£U reU > re£ · r£U rnewe£ = reU · r−1£U
11 AeU$ r$U > reU · r$e rneweU = r$U · r−1$e
12 AeU£ re£ · r£U > reU rneweU = re£ · r£U
13 A£$e r$e · re£ < r$£ rnew$£ = r$e · re£
14 A£$U r$U < r$£ · r£U rnew$£ = r$U · r−1£U
15 A£e$ r$£ < re£ · r$e rnewe£ = r$£ · r−1$e
16 A£eU reU < re£ · r£U rnewe£ = reU · r−1£U
17 A£U$ r$U > r£U · r$£ rnew£U = r$U · r−1$£
18 A£Ue reU > r£U · re£ rnew£U = reU · r−1e£
19 AU$e r$e · reU < r$U rnew$U = r$e · reU
20 AU$£ r$£ · r£U < r$U rnew$U = r$£ · r£U
21 AUe$ r$U < reU · r$e rneweU = r$U · r−1$e
22 AUe£ re£ · r£U < reU rneweU = re£ · r£U
23 AU£$ r$U < r£U · r$£ rnew£U = r$U · r−1$£
24 AU£e reU < r£U · re£ rnew£U = reU · r−1e£
5. Main Results
One can apply arbitrages from Table 1 sequentially in any order and to any initial
exchange rates R. The situation that we have in mind is the following. Suppose that
there exists an Arbiter who knows current ensemble R of exchange rates. This Arbiter
could provide information to the FX traders in any order he wants, thus activating the
chain (or superposition) of corresponding arbitrages. The principal question is:
Question 1. How powerful is the Arbiter?
The short answer is: the Arbiter is surprisingly powerful.
Let us explain at a more formal level what we mean.
For a finite chain of arbitrages A = A1 · · ·An, and for a given ensemble R of initial
exchange rates, we denote the resulting ensemble of principal exchange rates as
RA = RA1 · · ·An (8)
If R is balanced, then RA = R for any individual arbitrage, and therefore RA = R for
any chain (8). If, on the contrary, R is not balanced, then different arbitrage chains (8)
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could result in different balanced or unbalanced ensembles of principal exchange rates.
Denote by S(R) the collection of the sets RA related to all possible chains (8). Denote
also by Sbal(R) the subset of S(R), that includes only balanced exchange rates ensembles.
Our principal observation is the following:
For a typical unbalanced exchange rate ensemble R, the set Sbal(R) is unexpectedly
rich; therefore the Arbiter, who prescribes a particular sequence of arbitrages, is an un-
expectedly powerful figure.
To avoid cumbersome notation and technical details when providing a rigorous for-
mulation of this observation, we concentrate on the simplest initial ensemble. Let us
consider the ensemble
R¯α = (α · r¯$e, r¯$£, r¯$U, r¯e£, r¯eU, r¯£U) , (9)
where α > 0, α 6= 1 and R¯ is a given balanced ensemble of principal exchange rates. The
ensemble (9) is not balanced. The ensemble (9) may have emerged as follows. Let us
suppose that the underlying balanced rates
R¯ = (r¯$e, r¯$£, r¯$U, r¯e£, r¯eU, r¯£U) (10)
had been in operation up to a certain reference time moment 0. At this moment the
dollar trader has decided to increase his price for euros by a factor α > 1. A natural
respecification of Question 1 is the following:
Question 2. To which balanced exchange rates can the Arbiter now bring the foreign
exchange market?
The possible general structure of elements from the corresponding sets S(R¯α) and
Sbal(R¯α) is easy to describe. To this end we denote by Tα(R¯) the collection of all
sextuples of the form
(αn1 · r¯$e, αn2 · r¯$£, αn3 · r¯$U, αn4 · r¯e£, αn5 · r¯eU, αn6 · r¯£U) , (11)
where ni are integer numbers (positive, negative or zero). We also denote by T
bal
α the
subset of elements of Tα, which satisfy the relationships
n4 = n2 − n1, n5 = n3 − n1, n6 = n3 − n2.
Proposition 2. The following inclusions hold:
S(Rα) ⊂ Tα(R¯), (12)
Sbal(R¯α) ⊂ T balα (R¯). (13)
Proof. The ensemble (10) belongs to T . To verify (12) we show that the set Tα is
invariant with respect to each arbitrage A from Table 1. This statement can be checked
by inspection. Let us, for instance, apply to a sextuple (11) the first arbitrage A$e£.
Then, by definition, either this arbitrage is inactive, or it changes the first component
αn1 · r¯$e of (11) to the new value
rnew$e =
αn2 · r¯$£
αn4 · r¯e£ = α
n2−n4 · r¯$£
r¯e£
. (14)
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However, the ensemble R¯ is balanced, and, by the first equation (6), r¯$£r¯e£ = r¯$e. Therefore,
(14) implies that the ensemble R¯A$e£ also may be represented in the form (11). We
have proved the first part of the proposition, related to the set S(R¯α). The inclusion
(13) follows now from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 in no way answers Question 2. This proposition, however, allows us to
reformulate this question in a more constructive form:
Question 3. How big is the set Sbal(R¯α), compared with the collection T
bal
α (R¯) of all
elements that satisfy the restrictions imposed by Proposition 2?
The naive expectation would be that the set Sbal(R¯α) is finite and, at least for values
of α close to 1, that all elements of Sbal(R¯α) are close to R¯. However,the following
statement, describing an unexpected feature of the power of the Arbiter, is true.
Theorem 1. The set Sbal(R¯α) coincides with T
bal
α (R¯):
Sbal(R¯α) = T
bal
α (R¯). (15)
Moreover each balanced ensemble (11) may be achieved via a chain of arbitrage operations
no longer than
N(n1, n2, n3) = 3(|n1 − 1|+ |n2|+ |n3|) + 3. (16)
Loosely speaking, this theorem means that the Arbiter is extremely powerful. An
assertion similar to Theorem 1 was formulated as a hypothesis in [31]. We describe the
algorithms corresponding to this theorem in the next section.
The following assertion certifies that the estimate (16) from Theorem 1 is pretty close
to the optimal.
Proposition 3. The inequalities
|n1 − n2 + n4|, |n1 − n3 + n5)|, |n2 − n3 + n6| ≤ 1
hold for any R ∈ S(R¯α). Here ni are the integers from representation (11) of R.
Proof. This assertion is a special case of Lemma 7 which will be considered below.
Note that the set S(R¯α) is, in contrast to (15), much smaller than the totality Tα(R¯)
of all ensembles of the form (11). In particular, the following assertion holds:
Proposition 4. Let A denote a chain of arbitrages of length N , and R = R¯αA. Then
3(|n1−1|+ |n2|+ |n3|) ≤ N +8, where n1, n2, n3 are the integers from the representation
(11) of R.
Let us consider an infinite arbitrage chain:
A = A1A2A3 · · ·An · · · . (17)
This chain is periodic with minimal period p if An = An+p for n = 1, 2, . . ., and p is
the minimal positive integer with this property. Various periodic chains of arbitrage
play a special role in context of this article, and we summairise below some interesting
9
features of such periodic arbitrage chains. For a periodic chain (17) and for an initial
(unbalanced) exchange rate ensemble R0 we consider the sequence
R0,R1,R2, . . . ,Rn, . . . (18)
defined by Rn = Rn−1An, n = 1, 2, . . . .
Proposition 5. Either (i) the sequence (18) is periodic for n ≥ 36p; or (ii) this sequence
is diverging: at least one of the following six relationships hold:
r$en → 0, r$£n → 0, r$Un → 0, r$en →∞, r$£n →∞, r$Un →∞.
Moreover, in Case (i) the minimal period of the sequence is a divisor of 24p; in Case
(ii) there exist a divisor q of 24p and factors γ$e, . . . , γ£U such that the relationships
r$en+q = γ$er$en, . . . , r£Un+q = γ£Ur$en hold for n ≥ 36p.
Proof. This statement follows from Lemmas 3 and 4.
To conclude this discussion, we note one more unexpected feature of periodic chains
of arbitrage. A chain (17) is regular for the initial ensemble R0 if this chain includes
all 24 arbitrages, and each arbitrage is active infinitely many times while generating the
sequence (18). By analogy with typical results from the desynchronised systems theory,
one could expect a regular chain of arbitrage elements of the corresponding sequence (18)
should be balanced for sufficiently large n. However, this is not the case: the sequences
(18) may be both periodic (after some transient period) or diverging.
As an instructive example consider the 24-periodic chain A∗ which is defined by the
following equations:
A1 = A
(15), A2 = A
(10), A3 = A
(3), A4 = A
(21),
A5 = A
(11), A6 = A
(8), A7 = A
(24), A8 = A
(17),
A9 = A
(6), A10 = A
(9), A11 = A
(16), A12 = A
(13),
A13 = A
(12), A14 = A
(22), A15 = A
(14), A16 = A
(18),
A17 = A
(23), A18 = A
(15), A19 = A
(5), A20 = A
(7),
A21 = A
(4), A22 = A
(19), A23 = A
(1), A24 = A
(5).
Proposition 6. For the initial ensemble R0 = R¯α the corresponding sequence (18) is
periodic with minimal period 24, and all arbitrages from A∗ are active.
Proof. By inspection.
This proposition demonstrates that arbitrage operation chains may display periodicity
and no necessary convergence on a cross exchange rate law of one price. See Figs. 5, 7
and formula (31) below for an explanation of the geometrical meaning of the arbitrage
chain A∗.
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6. The Basic Algorithm
Introduce the following chains of arbitrages of length 3:
A
(1)
+ = A
(21)
A
(16)
A
(1), A
(2)
+ = A
(3)
A
(17)
A
(10), A
(3)
+ = A
(5)
A
(18)
A
(12),
A
(1)
− = A
(8)
A
(9)
A
(11), A
(2)
− = A
(15)
A
(18)
A
(14), A
(3)
− = A
(21)
A
(23)
A
(20).
It is convenient to define the mapping σ(n) which corresponds to a non-negative integer
n by the symbol “+”, and by the symbol “−” for a negative integer.
Proposition 7. The chain
A(n1, n2, n3) =
(
A
(3)
σ(n3)
)|n3|(
A
(2)
σ(n2)
)|n2|
A(15)A(18)
(
A
(1)
σ(n1)
)|n1−1|
A(5) (19)
satisfies Theorem 1: the ensemble R¯αA(n1, n2, n3) coincides with(
αn1 · r¯$e, αn2 · r¯$£, αn3 · r¯$U, αn1−n2 · r¯e£, αn1−n3 · r¯eU, αn2−n3 · r¯£U
)
,
and the length N of the chain (19) satisfies N ≤ 3(|n1 − 1|+ |n2|+ |n3|) + 3.
The legitimacy of this algorithm may be verified by induction. However a simple
geometric proof is much more instructive. This proof will be given later on. This chain
is not always the shortest: for instance, in the case n1 = n2 = n3 = 0 the shortest chain
A is of length one: A = A7.
7. General case
7.1. Direct Generalisation
We begin with the following comment. The ensemble (9) is the first item in the list
R¯1α = (α · r¯$e, r¯$£, r¯$U, r¯e£, r¯eU, r¯£U) ,
R¯2α = (r¯$e, α · r¯$£, r¯$U, r¯e£, r¯eU, r¯£U) ,
R¯3α = (r¯$e, r¯$£, α · r¯$U, r¯e£, r¯eU, r¯£U) ,
R¯4α = (r¯$e, r¯$£, r¯$U, α · r¯e£, r¯eU, r¯£U) ,
R¯5α = (r¯$e, r¯$£, r¯$U, r¯e£, α · r¯eU, r¯£U) ,
R¯6α = (r¯$e, r¯$£, r¯$U, r¯e£, r¯eU, α · r¯£U) .
(20)
A natural “relabelling” procedure confirms that the main results described in Section 5
hold without any changes for first initial ensemble from the list (20). In particular,
Theorem 1 implies
Corollary 1. The equality Sbal(R¯iα) = T
bal
α (R¯) holds for i = 2, 3. Moreover each bal-
anced ensemble (11) may be achieved via a chain of arbitrage operations no longer than
N i(n1, n2, n3), where
N2(n1, n2, n3) = 3(|n1|+ |n2 − 1|+ |n3|) + 3,
N3(n1, n2, n3) = 3(|n1|+ |n2|+ |n3 − 1|) + 3,
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To describe the corresponding algorithms we introduce the auxiliary chains
A˜
(1)
+ = A
(1)
A
(21)
A
(16), A˜
(2)
+ = A
(13)
A
(23)
A
(16), A˜
(3)
+ = A
(24)
A
(12)
A
(19).
A˜
(1)
− = A
(9)
A
(11)
A
(8), A˜
(2)
− = A
(9)
A
(34)
A
(4), A˜
(3)
− = A
(6)
A
(11)
A
(17);
˜˜A
(1)
+ = A
(18)
A
(12)
A
(5), ˜˜A
(2)
+ = A
(23)
A
(16)
A
(13), ˜˜A
(3)
+ = A
(18)
A
(12)
A
(5).
˜˜A
(1)
− = A
(20)
A
(21)
A
(23), ˜˜A
(2)
− = A
(4)
A
(9)
A
(24), ˜˜A
(3)
− = A
(20)
A
(21)
A
(23).
The equation (19) can be modified to the form
A2(n1, n2, n3) =
(
A˜
(1)
σ(n1)
)|n1|
A
(24)
A
(12)
(
A˜
(3)
σ(n3)
)|n3|(
A˜
(2)
σ(n2)
)|n2−1|
A
(1)
for i = 2, and to the form
A3(n1, n2, n3) =
(
˜˜A
(2)
σ(n2)
)|n2|(
˜˜A
(1)
σ(n1)
)|n1|
A
(12)
A
(10)
(
˜˜A
(3)
σ(n3)
)|n3−1|
A
(3)
for i = 3.
Let us turn to the initial ensembles R¯iα, i = 4, 5, 6.
Proposition 8. The equality Sbal(R¯iα) = T
bal
α (R¯) holds for i = 4, 5, 6. Moreover
each balanced ensemble (11) may be achieved via a chain of arbitrage no longer than
N i(n1, n2, n3), where
N4,5,6(n1, n2, n3) = 3(|n1|+ |n2|+ |n3|) + 4.
The corresponding chains A4(n1, n2, n3), i = 4, 5, 6, may be defined by the following
equations:
A4(n1, n2, n3) = A
(12)A(n1 + 1, n2, n3)
= A(12)
(
A
(3)
σ(n3)
)|n3|(
A
(2)
σ(n2)
)|n2|
A(15)A(18)
(
A
(1)
σ(n1)
)|n1|
A(5),
A5(n1, n2, n3) = A
(16)A(n1 + 1, n2, n3)
= A(16)
(
A
(3)
σ(n3)
)|n3|(
A
(2)
σ(n2)
)|n2|
A(15)A(18)
(
A
(1)
σ(n1)
)|n1|
A(3),
A6(n1, n2, n3) = A
(16)A2(n1 + 1, n2, n3)
= A(10)
(
A˜
(1)
σ(n1)
)|n1|
A(24)A(12)
(
A˜
(3)
σ(n3)
)|n3|(
A˜
(2)
σ(n2)
)|n2−1|
A(1).
Proof. This assertion may be proved analogously to Theorem 1.
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7.2. Arbitrage Discrepancies
To formulate further generalisations we need an additional notion. To each ensemble
R = (r$e, r$£, r$U, re£, reU, r£U) we attach an arbitrage discrepancies ensemble, using
the relationships for balanced principal exchange rates given in (6) above
D(R) = (de£(R), deU(R), d£U(R))
as follows:
de£(R) = log re£ − log r$£ + log r$e,
deU(R) = log reU − log r$U + log r$e,
d£U(R) = log r£U − log r$U + log r$£.
(21)
For instance
D(R¯1α) = a(1, 1, 0), D(R¯
2
α) = a(−1, 0, 1), D(R¯3α) = a(0,−1,−1),
D(R¯4α) = a(1, 0, 0), D(R¯
5
α) = a(0, 1, 0), D(R¯
6
α) = a(0, 0, 1),
(22)
where a = logα.
Proposition 9. The ensemble R is balanced, if and only if D(R) = 0.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1 and equations (21).
7.3. Case A
The case where two of the discrepancies (21) are equal to zero was implicitly consid-
ered in Section 7.1: see the second line in (22) and Proposition 8.
7.4. Case B
Consider now the case when one of the discrepancies in (21) is equal to zero, while
two others are not. We will be particularly interested in the situation where two nonzero
discrepancies are different. This situation may have emerged, for instance, as follows.
Let us suppose that the underlying balanced rates (10) had been in operation up to a
certain reference time moment 0. At this moment the Euro trader has decided to change
two of three his rates, namely re£ and reU, by different factors α and β. Then at this
moment the two discrepancies would acquire different non-zero values, while the third
discrepancy remains equal to zero.
Suppose, for example that d£U = 0, while de£, deU 6= 0. We introduce the ratio
q(R) =
deU(R)
de£(R)
. (23)
Theorem 2. Let the number (23) be irrational. Then set Sbal(R) is dense in the totality
T bal of all possible balanced ensembles.
A proof of this assertion will be given later on.
Consider also the case where q = q(R) is a rational number: q = m/n with co-prime
integers m,n (including the possibilities m = 1 or n = 1). Denote also
α = exp(deU/n).
The following assertion is a straightforward analog of Proposition 2.
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Proposition 10. The inclusions S(R) ⊂ Tα(R) and Sbal(R) ⊂ T balα (R) hold.
The following is an analog of Theorem 1:
Proposition 11. The equality Sbal(R) = T bal(R) holds.
A proof of this assertion will be given later on.
Note that the expressions like (16) are not valid in general. Similar expressions may
be established, however, for the cases m = 1 or n = 1. Note also that the case when
the discrepancy triplet is of one the forms (a, a, 0) or (a, 0,−a) or (0, a, a), a 6= 0, was
implicitly considered in Section 7.1: see the first line in (22) and Proposition 8.
7.5. Case C
Consider the case where all three arbitrage discrepancies (21) are not equal to zero.
Corollary 2. Let at least one of the ratios
q1(R) =
deU(R)
de£(R)
, q2(R) =
d£U(R)
de£(R)
(24)
be irrational. Then the set Sbal(R) is dense in the totality T bal of all possible balanced
ensembles.
Suppose now that both ratios (24) are rational:
q1(R) =
m1
n1
, q2(R) =
m2
n2
.
Denote by lcm(n1, n2) the least common multiple of the corresponding denominators.
Denote
α(R) = exp
(
de£(R)
lcm(n1, n2)
)
.
Proposition 12. The relationships S(R) ⊂ Tα(R) and Sbal(R) ⊂ T balα (R) hold.
Corollary 3. Let
lcm(n1, n2) = n1 · n2. (25)
Then Sbal(R) = T balα (R).
Proof. This assertion as well as formulated below Corollary 4 follows from Proposition 11
together with Lemma 17.
Consider finally the case when the ratios q1(R) and q2(R) are rational, but (25) does
not hold. In this case we introduce the number γ such that di = kiγ where the numbers
ki are integers and their greatest common divisor, gcd(k1, k2, k3), is equal to 1. Consider
also the following six numbers:
a1 = gcd(k1, k2), a2 = gcd(k1, k3),
a3 = gcd(k2, k3), a4 = gcd(k1, k2 − k3),
a5 = gcd(k2, k1 + k3), a6 = gcd(k3, k1 − k2).
(26)
Introduce also the numbers αi = exp ai, i = 1, . . . , 6.
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Corollary 4. The equation Sbal(R) = ∪6i=1T balαi (R) holds.
Note that all six numbers in (26) may indeed be greater than one. For instance,
consider: k1 = 595, k2 = 1683, k3 = 308. By inspection, gcd(k1, k2, k3) = 1, and
a1 = gcd(k1, k2) = 17, a2 = gcd(k1, k3) = 7,
a3 = gcd(k2, k3) = 11, a4 = gcd(k1 − k2, k3) = 4,
a5 = gcd(k1 + k3, k2) = 3, a6 = gcd(k1, k2 − k3) = 5.
8. Proofs
From this point onward we discuss the proofs of the theorems formulated above.
This part of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 8.1 we introduce, as a useful
auxiliary tool, stronger arbitrage procedures. Using strong arbitrages, we “linearise the
problem”, reducing it to investigation of all possible products of 12 explicitly written
6 × 6-matrices. Afterwards, in Section 8.2 we separate a family of 12 3 × 3-matrices
G(i) such that the products of these matrices completely describe the dynamics of the
discrepancy triplets. The properties of such products appear to be of key importance, and
these are investigated in Section 8.3. The results are applied in Section 8.4. Sections 8.5
and 8.6 are dedicated to finalising the proof of Theorem 1. Finally, in Sections 8.7–8.9
we provide proofs for Theorem 2 and Proposition 11.
8.1. Strong Arbitrages
We use, as an auxiliary tool, stronger arbitrage procedures. Let us begin with an
example. Consider the currencies triplet ($e£). For a given R we define the strong
arbitrage Aˆ$e£R as A$e£ if the inequality (7) holds, and as Ae$£, otherwise. Note that
in both cases the result in terms of principal exchange rates is the same: the rate r$e is
changed to new$e =
r$U
re£
.
The strong arbitrage Aˆ$eU is the second entry in Table 2 of the possible 12 strong
arbitrages. The meaning of a strong arbitrage is simple. This is an arbitrage balancing a
sub-FX market such as $eU by changing the exchange rate for a pair such as Dollar 
Euro. We will use, where convenient, the notation Aˆ(n) for the arbitrage number n from
this table.
Proposition 13. For any arbitrage chain (8), and any initial exchange rates R, there
exists a chain Aˆ = Aˆ1 · · · Aˆn of strong arbitrages such that RAˆ = RA. Conversely, for
any chain Aˆ = Aˆ1 · · · Aˆn of strong arbitrages, and any initial exchange rates R, there
exists a chain of arbitrages such that RAˆ = RA.
This proposition reduces investigation of the questions from the previous section to
investigation of analogous questions related to chains of strong arbitrages.
Now we relate each strong arbitrage to a 6× 6 matrix B(A) as follows:
B$e£ = B
(1) =
 0 0 0 0 0 0−1 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B$eU = B(2) =
 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
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Table 2: Strong arbitrages
Number Strong arbitrage Action Numbers of arbitrages
1 Aˆ$e£ r
new
$e = r$£ · r−1e£ 1, 7
2 Aˆ$eU rnew$e = r$U · r−1eU 2, 8
3 Aˆ$£e r
new
$£ = r$e · re£ 3, 13
4 Aˆ$£U rnew$£ = r$U · r−1£U 4, 14
5 Aˆ$Ue rnew$U = r$,e · reU 5, 19
6 Aˆ$U£ rnew$U = r$£ · r£U 6, 20
7 Aˆe£$ r
new
e£ = r$£ · r−1$e 9, 15
8 Aˆe£U rnewe£ = reU · r−1£U 10, 16
9 AˆeU$ rneweU = r$U · r−1$e 11, 21
10 AˆeU£ rneweU = re£ · r£U 12, 22
11 Aˆ£U$ rnew£U = r$U · r−1$£ 17, 23
12 Aˆ£Ue rnew£U = reU · r−1e£ 18, 24
B$£e = B
(3) =
 1 0 0 1 0 00 1 0 1 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , B$£U = B(4) =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
 ,
B$Ue = B
(5) =
 1 0 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
 , B$U£ = B(6) =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
Be£$ = B
(7) =
 1 −1 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , Be£U = B(8) =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 00 −1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
BeU$ = B
(9) =
 1 0 0 0 −1 00 1 0 0 0 00 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
 , BeU£ = B(10) =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 1 00 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
B£U$ = B
(11) =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
 , B£Ue = B(12) =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 1 −1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
For any ensemble R = (r$e, r$£, r$U, re£, reU, r£U) we denote
logR = (log r$e, log r$£, log r$U, log re£, log reU, log r£U) .
Proposition 14. The equation log(RAˆ(i)) = (logR)B(i) holds for i = 1, . . . , 12.
Proof. Follows from definitions.
8.2. A Special Coordinate System
In the six-dimensional real coordinate space R6 we introduce the vectors
v1 = (1,−1, 0, 1, 0, 0), v2 = (1, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0), v3 = (0, 1,−1, 0, 0, 1).
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By definition for any ensemble R
〈v1, logR〉 = de£(R), 〈v2, logR〉 = deU(R), 〈v3, logR〉 = d£U(R),
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the usual inner product in R6.
Propositions 1 and 14 together imply
Corollary 5. The three-dimensional subspace 〈v1,v〉 = 〈v2,v〉 = 〈v3,v〉 = 0 is invariant
with respect to each linear operator v → vB(i), i = 1, . . . , 12.
We introduce in R6 the new basis
{e1, e2, e3,v1,v2,v3};
here e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), e2 = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), v3 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0). By the last corollary
in this basis the matrices of the linear operators v → vB(i) have the block-triangular
form:
D(i) =
(
1 0
H(i) G(i)
)
.
Here
0 =
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , 1 =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 ,
and G(i), H(i) are some 3× 3-matrices.
Denote
v(R) = (log r$e, log r$£, log r$U, de£(R), deU(R), d£U(R)) .
Proposition 15. The equality v(RAˆ(i)) = v(R)D(i) holds for i = 1, . . . , 12.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 14.
The matrices D(i) may be written explicitly as
QB(i)Q−1, (27)
where
Q =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 −1 0 1 0 0
1 0 −1 0 1 0
0 1 −1 0 0 1
 , Q−1 =

1 0 0 −1 −1 0
0 1 0 1 0 −1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 . (28)
Lemma 1. The following equations are valid:
G(1) =
( 0 −1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
)
, G(2) =
( 1 0 0
−1 0 0
0 0 1
)
, G(3) =
(
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
)
,
G(4) =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
)
, G(5) =
( 1 0 0
0 0 −1
0 0 1
)
, G(6) =
( 1 0 0
0 1 0
0 −1 0
)
,
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G(7) =
(
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
)
, G(8) =
( 0 0 0
1 1 0
−1 0 1
)
, G(9) =
(
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
)
,
G(10) =
(
1 1 0
0 0 0
0 1 1
)
, G(11) =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
)
, G(12) =
( 1 0 −1
0 1 1
0 0 0
)
,
and
H(1) =
(−1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
, H(2) =
( 0 0 0
−1 0 0
0 0 0
)
, H(3) =
(
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
,
H(4) =
( 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 −1 0
)
, H(5) =
(
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
)
, H(6) =
(
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
)
,
H(i) = 0, i = 7, . . . , 12.
Proof. Follows by inspection from (27), (28).
Proposition 16. The discrepancy ensemble D(RAˆ) depends only on D(R) and Aˆ, and
may be written as follows: D(RAˆ(i)) = D(R)G(i). Here i is the number of a strong
arbitrage as listed in Table 2.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 15.
By the last proposition a discrepancy ensemble D(RAˆ) related to an arbitrage chain
Aˆ = Aˆ1 · · · Aˆn may be written as
D(RAˆ) = D(R)
n∏
i=1
Gi.
Therefore the set G of all possible products of the matrices G(i) is of interest.
8.3. Structure of the Set G
The following assertion is the key observation of our paper:
Lemma 2. The set G consists of 229 elements.
Proof. By inspection
Denote by Aˆ the totality of all finite chains of strong arbitrages.
Corollary 6. For a given R the set D(R) = {D(RAˆ) : A ∈ A} consists of less than 230
elements.
Let us discuss briefly the structure of the set G. A subset G of G is called a connected
component, if for any G1, G2 ∈ G there exists G ∈ G satisfying G2 = G1G. By the
definition different connected components do not intersect.
Lemma 3. The set G is partitioned into 14 connected components U1, . . . U14. Each of
the first six connected components includes 24 matrices of range 2; each of the connected
components U7, . . . U13 includes 12 matrices of range one; the last component contains a
single zero matrix.
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The sets U1, . . . , U6 may be characterised by the following inclusions:
G(2i−1), G(2i) ∈ Ui, i = 1, . . . , 6.
To identify the connected components U7, . . . U13 we list below the smallest lexicograph-
ical matrices from these components(−1 −1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
)
∈ U7,
( 0 0 0
−1 −1 0
0 0 0
)
∈ U8,
( 0 0 0
0 0 0
−1 −1 0
)
∈ U9,(−1 −1 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
)
∈ U10,
(−1 −1 0
0 0 0
−1 −1 0
)
∈ U11,
( 0 0 0
−1 −1 0
1 1 0
)
∈ U12,(−1 −1 0
1 1 0
−1 −1 0
)
∈ U13.
One can move from one connected component Ui to another component Uj applying
a matrix G(i), i = 1, . . . , 12. Let us describe the set of possible transitions. We will use
the notation Ui  Uj if such a transition is possible.
Lemma 4. The following relationships hold:
U1  U9, U10, U13, U2  U8, U11, U13, U3  U7, U12, U13,
U4  U8, U9, U12, U5  U7, U9, U11, U6  U7, U8, U10.
Also Ui  U14, i = 1, . . . , 13.
Proof. By inspection.
Lemma 5. For any G ∈ G either G or G2 or G3 is a projector.
Proof. By inspection.
8.4. Discrepancy Dynamics
The structure of the set G explained above induces structuring of the set of dis-
crepancies, which we discuss below. We say that a set D of discrepancies is a connected
component if for any D1,D2 ∈D there exists an arbitrage chain A satisfying D1A = D2.
For a given reals a, b we denote by D(a, b) the set of different triplets from the collection
D1(a, b) = (a, b,−a+ b) , D2(a, b) = (−a+ b, b, a) ,
D3(a, b) = (a, a− b,−b) , D4(a, b) = (−a+ b,−a,−b) ,
D5(a, b) = (−b, a− b, a) , D6(a, b) = (−b,−a,−a+ b) ,
D7(a, b) = (0, b,−a+ b) , D8(a, b) = (a, 0,−a+ b) ,
D9(a, b) = (a, b, 0) , D10(a, b) = (0, b, a) ,
D11(a, b) = (−a+ b, 0, a) , D12(a, b) = (−a+ b, b, 0) ,
D13(a, b) = (0,−a,−b) , D14(a, b) = (−a+ b, 0,−b) ,
D15(a, b) = (−a+ b,−a, 0) , D16(a, b) = (0, a− b,−b) ,
D17(a, b) = (a, 0,−b) , D18(a, b) = (a, a− b, 0) ,
D19(a, b) = (0, a− b, a) , D20(a, b) = (−b, 0, a) ,
D21(a, b) = (−b, a− b, 0) , D22(a, b) = (0,−a,−a+ b) ,
D23(a, b) = (−b, 0,−a+ b) , D24(a, b) = (−b,−a, 0) .
(29)
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Lemma 6. Each set D(a, b) is a connected component, and each connected component
coincides with a certain set D(a, b).
Proof. This statement may be proved by inspection.
Let us discuss in brief the structure of the sets D(a, b) for different values a, b. Clearly,
D(0, 0) consists of the single zero triplet D0 = (0, 0, 0). The connected components
D(±a, 0), D(0,±a), D(a, a), D(−a,−a) coincide and include the following 12 elements:
D1(a) = a( 0, 0, 1), D2(a) = a(−1, 0, 1),
D3(a) = a(−1, 0, 0), D4(a) = a(−1,−1, 0),
D5(a) = a( 0,−1, 0), D6(a) = a( 0,−1,−1),
D7(a) = a( 0, 0,−1), D8(a) = a( 1, 0,−1),
D9(a) = a( 1, 0, 0), D10(a) = a( 1, 1, 0),
D11(a) = a( 0, 1, 0), D12(a) = a( 0, 1, 1).
(30)
We use notation D(a) for this set. Geometrically the set D(a) represents vertices of a
partly distorted truncated cuboctahedron, or triangular orthobicupola, shown in Fig. 1.
The structure of this component will be explained in more detail in Section 8.6. The
set D(a,−a), D(a, 2a), D(a, a/2), also consists of 12 elements. Geometrically these sets
D(a) represent vertices of a distorted truncated tetrahedron, shown in Fig. 2. Otherwise,
a set D(a, b), consists of 24 elements, and represents vertices of a distorted truncated
octahedron, shown in Fig. 3. The structure of this component will be explained in more
detail in Section 8.7.
Figure 1: Left: the form of a polyhedron with vertices D(a), a 6= 0; Right: the same polyhedron
transparent.
We formulate also a corollary of Proposition 4. For a set D of discrepancies we denote
by G(D) the collection of elements of the form DG(i), D ∈D, i = 1, . . . , 12.
Corollary 7. The equality
G(D(a, b)) = D(a, b))
⋃
D(a)
⋃
D(b)
⋃
D(a− b),
holds for a 6= b. Also G(D(a)) = D(a)⋃(0, 0, 0).
Some discrepancy triplets do not belong to any connected component; however any
element of the form DG(i) must belong to a connected component. More precisely:
20
Figure 2: Left: the form of polyhedrons with vertices D(a,−a), D(a, 2a), or D(a, a/2), a 6= 0; Right:
the same polyhedron transparent.
Figure 3: Left: a typical form of a generic polyhedron with vertices D(a, b); Right: the same polyhedron
transparent.
Proposition 17. The following inclusions hold:
(a, b, c)G(1,2) ∈D(c,−a+ b), (a, b, c)G(3,4) ∈D(a− c, b),
(a, b, c)G(5,6) ∈D(−b+ c, a), (a, b, c)G(7,8) ∈D(c, b),
(a, b, c)G(9,10) ∈D(a,−c), (a, b, c)G(11,12) ∈D(a, b).
Proof. This assertion may be proved by inspection.
8.5. Incremental Dynamics
For a given sextuple R we denote by R′ the triplet of the first three components of
R: R′ = (r$e, r$£, r$U). Denote further I(R, Aˆ) = log(RAˆ)′ − logR′, where Aˆ is a strong
arbitrage.
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Proposition 18. I(R, Aˆ) depends only on Aˆ and D(R) and may be described as follows:
I(R, Aˆ(1)) = d(R)H(1) =−de£(R) (1, 0, 0) ,
I(R, Aˆ(2)) = d(R)H(2) =−deU(R) (1, 0, 0) ,
I(R, Aˆ(3)) = d(R)H(3) = de£(R) (0, 1, 0) ,
I(R, Aˆ(4)) = d(R)H(4) =−d£U(R) (0, 1, 0) ,
I(R, Aˆ(5)) = d(R)H(5) = deU(R) (0, 0, 1) ,
I(R, Aˆ(6)) = d(R)H(6) = d£U(R) (0, 0, 1) .
Also the equalities I(R, Aˆ(i)) = d(R)H(i) = (0, 0, 0) hold for i = 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 15.
8.6. Proof of Theorem 1
This proceeds by graphing the detailed dynamics of the arbitrage discrepancies. In
this section we use the shorthand notation Di instead of Di(a).
Lemma 7. For any initial exchange rate ensemble belonging to the list (20), and for
any arbitrage chain, the corresponding sequence of discrepancies includes only elements
from the union D0
⋃
D(a), a = logα, see (30). The possible transition paths, arising
from the strong arbitrages listed in Table 1, are given in Table 3.
Figure 4 plots the corresponding graph. Figure 5 plots a similar graph, where the
numbers of the arbitrages from Table 1 are included, instead of the numbers of strong
arbitrages.
Proof. By inspection follows from Proposition 16.
Ignoring the zero vertex D0, the edges that lead to this vertex and directions of the
edges, another, polyhedral, representation of the graph plotted in Fig. 4 is given in Fig. 6.
The corresponding polyhedron is a distorted triangular orthobicupola, shown in Fig. 1.
The incidence matrix I of the graph plotted in Fig. 6 is as follows:
I =

1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

.
Now let us deal with the coupled discrepancies and the incremental dynamics.
Corollary 8. For any arbitrage chain the corresponding sequence of increments includes
only the zero triplet I0 = (0, 0, 0) or one of the following six triplets:
I1 = a(1, 0, 0), I2 = a(−1, 0, 0), I3 = a(0, 1, 0),
I4 = a(0,−1, 0), I5 = a( 0, 0, 1), I6 = a(0, 0,−1).
22
Table 3: Transition, caused by strong arbitrages from Table 1
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12
Aˆ(1) D1 D12 D11 D0 D5 D6 D7 D6 D5 D0 D11 D12
Aˆ(2) D1 D2 D3 D0 D9 D8 D7 D8 D9 D0 D3 D2
Aˆ(3) D1 D0 D7 D6 D5 D6 D7 D0 D1 D12 D11 D12
Aˆ(4) D1 D0 D3 D4 D5 D4 D3 D0 D9 D10 D11 D10
Aˆ(5) D1 D2 D3 D2 D1 D0 D7 D8 D9 D8 D7 D0
Aˆ(6) D5 D4 D3 D4 D5 D0 D11 D10 D9 D10 D11 D0
Aˆ(7) D1 D1 D0 D5 D5 D6 D7 D7 D0 D11 D11 D12
Aˆ(8) D2 D2 D0 D4 D4 D6 D8 D8 D0 D10 D10 D12
Aˆ(9) D1 D2 D3 D3 D0 D7 D7 D8 D9 D9 D0 D1
Aˆ(10) D12 D2 D3 D3 D0 D6 D6 D8 D9 D10 D0 D12
Aˆ(11) D0 D3 D3 D4 D5 D5 D0 D9 D9 D10 D11 D10
Aˆ(12) D0 D2 D2 D4 D6 D6 D0 D8 D8 D10 D12 D12
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Figure 4: Graph of the transitions caused by the strong arbitrages.
The dynamics of the increments I is conveniently visualised in Fig. 7.
The correctness of this description of the dynamics of the increments follows imme-
diately from Corollary 7 and Proposition 18. The legitimacy of the algorithms relevant
to Theorem 1 and, therefore, proof of Theorem 1 and Proposition 8 follows from Figs. 5
and 7.
We note also that the 24-periodic chain of arbitrage from Proposition 6 was also found
looking at Fig. 5 and 7. The corresponding route is quite natural from this perspective,
23
23,24
16
6
14
11
13,1
4 9
246
1
11
,12
19
16
24
2
15
,16
23
12
3
7 5
,6
14 1
7
21
8
9,1
0
17
12
13
1
1,
2
19
11
9
13
17,18
10
20
4
22
21
,225
10
18
8
19
,20
423
12
2
3,415
18 20
7
7
,8
5
21
15
3
D1D0
D2
D5
D9
D12
D3D4
D7
D11
D6
D8
D10
Figure 5: The previous graph with the arbitrage numbers, instead of the strong arbitrage numbers.
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Figure 6: The polyhedral representation of the principal graph.
and is given by
D10 → D11 → D10 → D12 → D1 → D12 → D2 → D3 →
D2 → D4 → D5 → D4 → D6 → D7 → D6 → D8 →
D9 → D8 → D10 → D8 → D6 → D4 → D2 → D12 → D10.
(31)
8.7. Commuters, Terminals and Knots
Now we move to a proof of Theorem 2 and Proposition 11. The case de£ = deU has
been considered in Section 7.1. Thus we can assume that de£ 6= deU.
The focus is again on the dynamics of the exchange rate discrepancies. The set
of all discrepancies that may be achievable from D = (a, b, 0) contains altogether 61
different elements, see Corollary 7. The corresponding connected component D(a, b),
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which contains D = (a, b, 0), see (29), contains 24 elements listed in (29). To describe the
detailed structure of this set we will introduce a new notation. The set D(a, b), contains
six elements that have all three components that are non-zero, and we re-denote these
elements by
C1 = (a, b,−a+ b) , C2 = (−a+ b, b, a) , C3 = (a, a− b,−b) ,
C4 = (−a+ b,−a,−b) , C5 = (−b, a− b, a) , C6 = (−b,−a,−a+ b) .
We call these ensembles commuters by way of analogy with passenger travel.
We call an element with two non-zero components a terminal, if d1 6= ±d2. There are
altogether 18 terminals in D(a, b). To each commuter Ci, i = 1, . . . , 6, we relate three
terminals T ji , j = 1, 2, 3, as follows:
T 11 = (0, b,−a+ b) , T 21 = (a, 0,−a+ b) , T 31 = (a, b, 0) ;
T 12 = (0, b, a) , T
2
2 = (−a+ b, 0, a) , T 32 = (−a+ b, b, 0) ;
T 13 = (0,−a,−b) , T 23 = (−a+ b, 0,−b) , T 33 = (−a+ b,−a, 0) ;
T 14 = (0, a− b,−b) , T 24 = (a, 0,−b) , T 34 = (a, a− b, 0) ;
T 15 = (0, a− b, a) , T 25 = (−b, 0, a) , T 35 = (−b, a− b, 0) ;
T 16 = (0,−a,−a+ b) , T 26 = (−b, 0,−a+ b) , T 36 = (−b,−a, 0) .
Lemma 8. The equalities
CiG
(7) = T 1i , CiH
(7) = (0, 0, 0),
CiG
(9) = T 2i , CiH
(9) = (0, 0, 0),
CiG
(11) = T 3i , CiH
(11) = (0, 0, 0)
25
hold for i = 1, . . . , 6. Also the following equalities hold: T ji G
(k) = Ci, for i = 1, . . . , 6,
j = 1, 2, 3, k = 8, 10, 12.
We group the commuters and terminals in six knots, K1, . . . ,K6 as follows:
Ki =
{
Ci, T
1
i , T
2
i , T
3
i
}
, i = 1, . . . , 6.
Figure 8 illustrates behaviour at a knot.
7
9 11
8
10
12
C
T1
T2
T3
Figure 8: The “commuter–terminals” graph of a knot
8.8. Travel Between Knots
Departing from a particular terminal, and applying some arbitrages with numbers k =
7, . . . , 12, one can travel to another terminal belonging to a different knot, simultaneously
“loading some cargo” upon the corresponded triplet R′. Details are given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 19. The following groups of equalities hold:
T 11G
(3) = T 12 , T
1
1H
(3) = (0, a, 0), T 11G
(5) = T 24 , T
1
1H
(5) = (0, 0, b);
T 21G
(1) = T 16 , T
2
1H
(1) = (−a, 0, 0), T 21G(6) = T 33 , T 21H(6) = (0, 0,−a);
T 31G
(2) = T 26 , T
3
1H
(2) = (−b, 0, 0), T 31G(4) = T 32 , T 31H(4) = (0, a− b, 0);
{
T 12G
(2) = T 25 , T
1
2H
(2) = (−b, 0, 0), T 12G(4) = T 31 , T 12H(4) = (0,−a, 0);
T 32G
(1) = T 22 , T
3
2H
(1) = (a− b, 0, 0), T 32G(6) = T 33 , T 32H(6) = (0, 0,−a);{
T 13G
(2) = T 24 , T
1
3H
(2) = (a, 0, 0), T 13G
(4)= T 36 , T
2
3H
(4) = (0, b, 0);
{
T 14G
(2) = T 23 , T
1
4H
(2) = (−a+ b, 0, 0), T 14G(4) = T 35 , T 14H(4) = (0, b, 0);
T 34G
(1) = T 13 , T
3
4H
(1) = (−a, 0, 0), T 34G(6) = T 31 , T 34H(6) = (0, 0,−b);
{
T 15G
(2) = T 22 , T
1
5H
(2) = (−a+ b, 0, 0), T 15G(4) = T 34 , T 15H(4) = (0,−a, 0);
T 35G
(1) = T 12 , T
3
5H
(1) = (b, 0, 0), T 35G
(6) = T 36 , T
3
5H
(6) = (0, 0, a);
{
T 16G
(2) = T 21 , T
1
6H
(2) = (a, 0, 0), T 16G
(4) = T 33 , T
1
6H
(4) = (0, a− b, 0).
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We introduce the “travel between knots” directed graph Γ as follows. This graph has
6 vertices that correspond to the knots K1, . . . ,K6. A knot Ki is connected by an arrow
with another knot Kj if one of terminals belonging to K
j figures in the rows belonging to
the i-th subset of equalities from Proposition 19. For instance, the knot K1 is connected
with K2,K3,K4,K6. Moreover each arrow corresponds to the three dimensional “cargo
vector(s)”: these vectors are related in a natural way to the increment vectors in the
equalities above. For instance, we attach the cargo-vectors (0, a − b, 0) and (0, a, 0) to
the K1 → K2 arrow. The incidence matrix of this graph is written below.
I(Γ) =

0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0

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Figure 9: The “travel between knots” graph Γ
8.9. Finalising the proof of Theorem 2 and Proposition 11
If the single transition Ki → Kj is possible we use W i→j for the corresponding
cargo; we will use W i→j1 ,W
i→j
2 if two transitions are possible. In the latter case W
i→j
1
refers to the upper vector indicated at graph Γ. For instance, W 1→21 = (0, a − b, 0),
W 1→22 = (0, a, 0), W
2→1 = (0,−a, 0), etc.
Lemma 9. For any positive integers N1, N2, N3 there exists a chain Aˆ of strong arbi-
trages such that RAˆ has the form
(r$e +m1a−N1b, r$£ +m2a+N2b, r$U +m3a−N3b)
where m1,m2,m3 are some positive integer numbers,
27
Proof. Since the moves from one terminal to another, within a particular knot, are always
possible and do not change R′ (see Lemma 8), any route allowed by the graph Γ can be
performed, and any combination of corresponding cargo can be loaded. For the cycle
K1 → K2 → K5 → K6 → K1 we have
W 1→21 +W
2→5
1 +W
5→6 +W 6→1 = (a− b, a, 0).
For the cycle K1 → K2 → K3 → K6 → K1 we have
W 1→22 +W
2→3 +W 3→6 +W 6→1 = (a, a+ b, a).
For the cycle K1 → K2 → K3 → K4 → K1 we have
W 1→22 +W
2→3 +W 3→4 +W 4→1 = (a, a, a− b).
Corollary 9. For any non-negative integers N1, N2, N3 and M1,M2,M3 there exists a
chain Aˆ of strong arbitrages such that RAˆ has the form (r$e +M1a−N1b, r$£ +M2a+
N2b, r$U +M3a−N3b).
Proof. From the lemma above it follows that we can achieve the state
(r$e +m1a− (N1 − 1)b, r$£ +m2a+ (N2)b, r$U +m3a− (N3 + 1)b, a, b,−a+ b).
Then moving to the terminal T 31 and applying arbitrage Aˆ
(6) we arrive at
(r$e + (m1 − 1)a− (N1)b, r$£ +m2a+ (N2)b, r$U +m3a−N3b, 0, a, 0).
However, from this state we can, by Proposition 1, adjust the numbers m1,m2,m3 to
the targets M1,M2,M3.
Theorem 2 and Proposition 11 follow immediately from this last corollary.
9. Concluding Remarks
The key contribution of this paper is to ask what happens to arbitrage sequences
when the number of goods or assets under consideration is four, rather than the two, or
occasionally three, usually considered. The model is illustrated with regard to a foreign
exchange market with four currencies and traders, so there are C24 = 6 principal exchange
rates. Despite abstracting from various complications – such as transaction costs, capital
requirements and risk – that are often invoked to explain the limits to arbitrage, we
find that the arbitrage operations conducted by the FX traders can generate periodicity
or more complicated behaviour in the ensemble of exchange rates, rather than smooth
convergence to a “balanced” ensemble where the law of one price holds.
We use the fiction of an Arbiter, who knows all the actual exchange rates and what
a balanced ensemble would be, to bring out the information problem. FX traders tend
to specialise in particular currencies, so the assumption that the FX traders are initially
aware only of the exchange rates for their own “domestic” currencies is not entirely im-
plausible. We show that the order in which the Arbiter reveals information to individual
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traders regarding discrepancies in exchange rate ensembles makes a key difference to the
arbitrage sequences that will be pursued. The sequences are periodic in nature, and
show no clear signs of convergence on a balanced ensemble of exchange rates. The Ar-
biter might know the law of one price exchange rate ensemble, but the traders have little
chance of stumbling onto such an ensemble by way of their arbitrage operations.
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